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(N.M. Greenauer), mariosav@ucy.ac.cy (M.N. AvraamWe examined whether people spontaneously represent the partner’s viewpoint in spatial
memory when it is available in advance and whether they adapt their spontaneous
descriptions accordingly. In 18 pairs, Directors studied arrays of objects while: (1) not
knowing about having to describe the array to a Matcher, (2) knowing about the subse-
quent description, and (3) knowing the Matcher’s subsequent viewpoint, which was offset
by 90, 135, or 180. In memory tests preceding descriptions, Directors represented the
Matcher’s viewpoint when it was known during study, taking longer to imagine orienting
to perspectives aligned with it and rotating their drawings of arrays toward it. Conversely,
when Directors didn’t know their Matcher’s viewpoint, they encoded arrays egocentrically,
being faster to imagine orienting to and to respond from perspectives aligned with their
own. Directors adapted their descriptions ﬂexibly, using partner-centered spatial expres-
sions more frequently when misaligned by 90 and egocentric ones when misaligned by
135. Knowing their misalignment in advance helped partners recognize when descrip-
tions would be most difﬁcult for Directors (at 135) and to mutually agree on using their
perspective. Thus, in collaborative tasks, people don’t rely exclusively on their spatial
memory but also use other pertinent perceptual information (e.g., their misalignment from
their partner) to assess the computational demands on each partner and select strategies
that maximize the efﬁciency of communication.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
When people provide driving directions, describe places
they have been to, or instruct a colleague aboutwhere to lo-
cate a folder in the ofﬁce, they rely on their ability to recall
accurately and communicate effectively spatial informa-
tion. In such situations, where people try to achieve mutual
understanding or a joint goal, they routinely consider their
conversational partner’s speciﬁc needs, knowledge, or per-. All rights reserved.
icha11@caledonian.
o), nmg12@psu.edu
ides).spective and adjust their behavior accordingly (Clark, 1996;
Clark & Carlson, 1982; Clark &Murphy, 1982). For example,
they may consider how familiar their partner is with the
environment and adjust the detail of their descriptions
(Hölscher, Tenbrink, & Wiener, 2011; Isaacs & Clark,
1987). Or, if they occupy a different vantage point than
their partner, as they often do when providing directions
over the phone or when moving a piece of furniture to-
gether, they may tailor their spatial descriptions to their
partner’s perspective (e.g., Schober, 1993, 1995).
Making a spatial judgment, and presumably also com-
municating spatial information, involves accessing mem-
ory representations that maintain the spatial relations
between objects and are organized around a preferred
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Valiquette, & Rump, 2004). The preferred direction of these
representations is determined by various sources of infor-
mation, including their initially experienced perspective
(Shelton & McNamara, 2001), the environment’s geometry
(Shelton & McNamara, 2001), the symmetry or intrinsic
structure of the spatial conﬁguration (Li, Carlson, Mou,
Williams, & Miller, 2011; Mou & McNamara, 2002), the
functional features of landmarks in the conﬁguration
(Taylor & Tversky, 1992), as well as instructions emphasiz-
ing a particular orientation (Greenauer & Waller, 2008). In
other words, the preferred organizing direction that people
adopt is not limited to egocentric experience, but can be
aligned with non-experienced perspectives reinforced by
other cues.
In this work, we examine whether the partner’s viewing
perspective also serves as such a cue (when available), con-
tributing to how people spontaneously organize spatial
information in memory and how they subsequently de-
scribe this information. We begin by surveying studies
using collaborative tasks that highlight some of the cogni-
tive and social factors that inﬂuence spatial perspective-
taking. These studies underscore that, on the basis of a
number of cognitive and social constraints, people make
attributions about the partner’s ability to contribute to
the task at hand, which inﬂuence whether they adopt their
partner’s perspective. Because these studies typically focus
only on people’s linguistic choices, it remains unclear (a)
whether the partner’s perspective is encoded in the mem-
ory representations supporting perspective-taking in com-
munication, and (b) the extent to which, when
communicating spatial information, people rely on the
organization of these memory representations that poten-
tially encode their partner’s perspective. With this motiva-
tion, we then present our study and, using theoretical
frameworks from conversational perspective-taking, make
predictions about the circumstances under which the part-
ner’s viewpoint is represented in spatial memory and af-
fects spatial descriptions.Cognitive and social constraints on spatial perspective-
taking
There has been some debate about the extent to which
people readily adopt their partner’s perspective in conver-
sation. When people share the same linguistic or physical
perspective, adopting the partner’s perspective may be
trivially easy. Under these circumstances of having same
viewpoint (whether spatial or conceptual), linguistic or
behavioral adjustments may be generic and not speciﬁc
to the partner’s needs (Brown & Dell, 1987; Dell & Brown,
1991). When people have perspectives or knowledge dis-
tinct from their partner’s, some studies suggest that
speakers initially behave egocentrically, failing to take
the partner’s perspective into account and considering it
only later in order to repair misunderstandings (Horton &
Keysar, 1996; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Paek, 1998; Keysar,
Barr, & Horton, 1998; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). However,
other studies demonstrate that under the right circum-
stances people can adapt early and ﬂexibly to theirpartner’s perspective (e.g., Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell,
2003; Metzing & Brennan, 2003). According to this latter
view, failures in perspective-taking occur when executive
functioning is taxed (Brown-Schmidt, 2009) or when infor-
mation about the partner isn’t available early enough (Kra-
ljic & Brennan, 2005) or requires complex inferences
(Gerrig, Brennan, & Ohaeri, 2000). But when information
about the partner can be represented as simple, relevant
distinctions, it can have an immediate effect on behavior,
particularly if these distinctions are computed easily and
known early (e.g., Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Galati & Bren-
nan, 2010).
Our hypothesis is that the factors predicting adaptation
during non-spatial perspective-taking predict adaptation
in spatial perspective-taking as well. Thus, speakers’ cogni-
tive constraints should inﬂuence not only whether they
readily consider their partner’s conceptual perspective,
knowledge, or agenda (see Schober, 1998) but also
whether they consider their partner’s spatial viewpoint.
More speciﬁcally, both the speaker’s own and their part-
ner’s cognitive constraints in adopting the other’s perspec-
tive should inﬂuence whose perspective is selected in
conversation. Indeed, the relative cognitive demands of
partners, depending on their misalignment, inﬂuence
speakers’ descriptions: compared to when partners share
the same perspective, speakers with misaligned partners
are more likely to adopt their partner’s perspective and
use partner-centered descriptions (e.g., ‘‘to your left’’ or
‘‘in front of you’’) than egocentric ones (Schober, 1993,
1995). The partners’ relative cognitive demands, depend-
ing on the framing of the task, also inﬂuence spatial
descriptions (Mainwaring, Tversky, Ohgishi, & Schiano,
2003). Replicating Schober (1993, 1995) and Mainwaring
and colleagues (2003) found that when speakers described
spatial information to a misaligned imaginary partner, who
presumably bore more of the cognitive burden, they were
more likely to adopt their partner’s perspective than their
own. Conversely, when speakers described spatial infor-
mation for themselves, thus bearing the cognitive burden
exclusively, they were more likely to adopt their own per-
spective than their partner’s. And when the cognitive bur-
den was presumably more equally distributed, when
speakers formulated yes/no questions to request spatial
information, they were more likely to use neutral perspec-
tives (including landmarks and compass directions) than
person-centered ones.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the proposal that
partners follow the principle of least collaborative effort:
they share responsibility for mutual understanding and
adapt their behavior to maximize the efﬁciency of
communication, while minimizing the collective effort of
themselves and their partner (Clark, 1996; Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Such adaptation is especially evident
when the partners’ respective ability to contribute to the
task differs, as when there are asymmetries in visual
evidence about the partner’s progress in a task (Brennan,
2004), or when interacting with a non-native speaker
(Bortfeld & Brennan, 1997). Evidence for such adaptation
in spatial perspective-taking comes from a task where
partners were preselected to have matched or mismatched
spatial abilities, assessed by a mental rotation task
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constraints, high-ability speakers were more likely to use
partner-centered descriptions when describing a conﬁgu-
ration, whereas low-ability speakers were more likely to
use egocentric ones. Critically, over time, high-ability
speakers describing conﬁgurations to low-ability partners
increased their use of partner-centered descriptions,
whereas low-ability speakers describing to high-ability
partners decreased their use of partner-centered descrip-
tions. This underscores that speakers adapt their descrip-
tions according to the attributions they make about each
other’s relative knowledge or ability to contribute to the
task, with the partner with the greater knowledge or abil-
ity expending greater effort to ensure mutual
understanding.
Similarly, social cues about the partner’s ability to con-
tribute to the task modulate whether people invest in
adopting their partner’s perspective, even when doing so
is more cognitively difﬁcult. Recently, Duran and col-
leagues (2011) examined spatial perspective-taking in a
task in which participants responded to requests for an ob-
ject from a simulated partner (e.g., ‘‘give me the folder on
the left’’). Both partners were depicted as sitting around a
round tabletop on which there were two folders, such that
on some trials the partner’s request was ambiguous (e.g.,
the request for ‘‘the folder on the left’’ was ambiguous
when the participant was depicted to be at 0 and the part-
ner at 270 with folders at the top-right and the bottom-
left of the table from the participant’s perspective). Based
on their mouse-tracked responses on such trials, partici-
pants were classiﬁed as either responding egocentrically
or from their partner’s perspective. Across experiments,
participants’ preference for the partner’s perspective was
modulated by attributional cues. Being told that their part-
ner did not know where they were seated (and therefore
could not consider their perspective) increased partner-
centered responding, despite its associated cognitive cost
relative to egocentric responding, reﬂected in longer re-
sponse times, greater deviations of the cursor towards
the competitor folder, more frequent switches in the cur-
sor’s direction, and more ‘‘acceleration components’’ (e.g.,
slowing down and then speeding up, reﬂecting hesitation).
On the other hand, being told that their conversational
partner was real, rather than simulated, increased egocen-
tric responding, presumably because participants shifted
the burden of ensuring mutual understanding to the part-
ner, who was the one requesting information and shared
the same goals in the task.
Attributional cues about the partner inﬂuence not only
how people interpret spatial descriptions (Duran, Dale, &
Kreuz, 2011; Tversky & Hard, 2009), but also how they pro-
duce them. For example, when describing arrays to an
imaginary (vs. real) partner, speakers are more likely to
use partner-centered descriptions and less likely to use
egocentric ones (Schober, 1993). Even minimal attribu-
tional cues, such as an imaginary partner’s familiarity with
the environment, alter speakers’ description strategies
appropriately: speakers planning routes in a familiar envi-
ronment for an unfamiliar, imaginary addressee (vs. for
themselves) used more words and details, navigating alongfewer, larger and more prominent streets, and referring to
more landmarks for orienting (Hölscher et al., 2011).
Together, these studies demonstrate that people con-
sider their collective effort and, on the basis of attributions
they make about their partner’s ability to contribute to the
task, adapt their production or interpretation of spatial
descriptions. A number of cognitive constraints and social
cues contribute to forming these attributions: their mis-
alignment from their partner, their own and their partners’
spatial ability, whether they can interact freely with their
partner, and whether they believe their partner is real,
familiar with the environment, or aware of their viewpoint.
As a result, they expend considerable effort to adopt their
partner’s perspective when conveying spatial information
to an imaginary partner (Hölscher et al., 2011; Schober,
1993), when feedback is constrained (Shelton &McNamara,
2004), when their partner has worse spatial abilities
(Schober, 2009) or doesn’t know their viewpoint (Duran
et al., 2011, Exp. 2; Shelton & McNamara, 2004). On the
other hand, they don’t invest as much effort in adopting
the partner’s perspective and instead rely on the partner
to request clariﬁcations as needed (see Clark, 1996; Clark
& Krych, 2004), when interacting with a real (Schober,
1993) or assumed to be real partner (Duran et al., 2011,
Exp. 3).
Nonetheless, investigations of spatial perspective-tak-
ing in collaborative tasks, especially those focusing on
the production of spatial descriptions, have usually sought
evidence for people’s perspective choices in linguistic
behavior without considering the underlying spatial mem-
ory representations that support perspective-taking. It is
therefore not clear whether the partner’s viewpoint can
be represented in memory—or rather, it is not clear under
what attributional cues it can be represented in memory.
One study by Shelton and McNamara (2004) shed some
light on this question by examining both speakers’ choices
in their spatial descriptions and their subsequent memory
performance. In this study, after describing an array to
their partner, speakers were more accurate to make judg-
ments from perspectives aligned with the one that their
partner had previously occupied than from other perspec-
tives. Speakers used mostly partner-centered descriptions
regardless of the degree of misalignment from their part-
ner, since they were explicitly instructed to describe arrays
from the partner’s perspective, with an arrow cueing them
of that perspective throughout the description. Addition-
ally, interactions were constrained, with addressees not
knowing where the speakers were relative to the display
and not being allowed to provide spoken feedback. Since
the experimental instructions and constraints on the part-
ner’s ability to contribute were intended to encourage
speakers to adopt their partner’s perspective in descrip-
tions, it’s not altogether surprising that speakers repre-
sented their partner’s perspective in memory. Evidently,
when situational constraints explicitly emphasize the part-
ner’s viewpoint, it can be used as the preferred direction
around which to organize information in memory. But in
the absence of such explicit emphasis on the partner’s per-
spective, it’s not clear whether people spontaneously use it
as a preferred organizing direction in memory. In our
study, we address directly whether the partner’s view-
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sufﬁciently compelling attributional cue to inﬂuence peo-
ple’s memory representations.
What is also unclear is the extent to which people rely
on their spatial memory representations (and their pre-
ferred organizing direction) when describing spatial infor-
mation. Speakers routinely access spatial memory
representations off-line to describe to their partner previ-
ously experienced environments, but previous collabora-
tive studies (including Shelton and McNamara’s, 2004)
have focused only on situations where spatial information
is visually accessible to speakers. Thus, is not clear
whether, when describing previously encoded spatial rela-
tions to a partner, speakers adopt the organizing direction
of their memories as the preferred perspective of their
descriptions or rely on perceptual information about their
partner, available during the interaction.1 After the description, the Matchers’ memory of the array they
reconstructed was also assessed, through JRDs and array drawings. In this
paper, we examine only the Directors’ memory performance and linguistic
descriptions, as our main research question focuses on Directors’ adapta-
tion toward their Matchers.The present study
In this work, we ask not only whether people spontane-
ously incorporate their partner’s viewpoint in spatial
memory representations, but also whether the organiza-
tion of spatial representations inﬂuences their subsequent
linguistic descriptions. To do so, we adapted Shelton and
McNamara’s (2004) design in a number of ways. First,
whereas in Shelton and McNamara participants learned
spatial arrays while describing them, we dissociated the
learning of arrays from their description to manipulate
what was known in advance about the partner’s viewpoint.
Manipulating participants’ communicative intent (whether
they knew they would be conveying spatial information to
a partner) and the availability of the partner’s viewpoint
(whether they knew it in advance or not) allowed us to as-
sess how attributions about their partner’s ability to con-
tribute to the subsequent collaborative task would affect
how they encoded spatial information in memory. Addi-
tionally, dissociating the learning of spatial arrays from
their description and thus having participants describe ar-
rays from memory rather than from vision (cf., Schober,
1993, 1995, 2009; Shelton & McNamara, 2004) enabled
us to examine the extent to which speakers rely on the
organization of their spatial memories when describing
spatial information.
Secondly, unlike Shelton and McNamara (2004), we did
not ‘‘force’’ participants to adopt a particular perspective
either when learning an array or when describing it; in
fact, we did not constrain participants’ interactions in
any way. As we have seen in the previous section, people
are more likely to invest in adopting the partner’s perspec-
tive when they cannot exchange spoken feedback or they
believe that their partner does not know their viewpoint.
In the absence of such constraints, we could assess
whether the partner’s viewpoint is a sufﬁciently strong
cue on its own to affect spatial memory. Speciﬁcally, we
wanted to determine whether under such circumstances,
people would use the partner’s viewpoint as a preferred
organizing direction, whether they would represent it in
memory but not use it as an organizing direction, or
whether they would ignore it altogether.Additionally, unlike some studies on spatial perspec-
tive-taking, in our study partners were misaligned by both
orthogonal (e.g., 90, 180) and oblique offsets (135).
Orthogonal perspectives (at 90, 180, and 270) may be
privileged, insofar as they are aligned with the canonical
axes of the speaker (see McNamara, 2003). They may be
therefore relatively easily adopted or maintained, which
could account for speakers’ linguistic choices in studies
where partners were misaligned exclusively by orthogonal
offsets (e.g., Schober, 1993, 1995, 2009; Mainwaring et al.,
2003). Also, whereas other spatial perspective-taking stud-
ies have used simplistic (often 2-object) conﬁgurations
(e.g., Duran et al., 2011; Mainwaring et al., 2003; Schober,
1993), we used sufﬁciently complex conﬁgurations of ob-
jects that would allow us to assess the preferred direction
with which people organized object relations in memory.
In our study, pairs of participants performed series of
tasks repeated across three blocks. In each block, one par-
ticipant, the Director, studied a table-top array of real ob-
jects and later described it from memory to the other
participant, the Matcher, who reconstructed the array
based on the Director’s descriptions. While studying the
array, Directors in the ﬁrst block didn’t know anything
about the upcoming description to a partner (No Intent
condition), and in the subsequent blocks either knew about
the description without knowing the Matcher’s viewpoint
(Intent condition) or knew about both the description
and the Matcher’s viewpoint (Co-Presence condition). After
studying an array, Directors’ memory of it was assessed
through two spatial memory tasks. The ﬁrst task involved
judgments of relative direction (JRDs), in which participants
were asked to imagine a speciﬁc location and orientation
and then to point to another object from that perspective.
The second task involved reconstructing the array by indi-
cating the position of each object on a grid circle represent-
ing their working area. After the memory tasks, Directors
described the array from memory to Matchers, who recon-
structed the described array with the same objects at a
separate workstation. During the description, partners
were offset by 90, 135, or 180.1
Our predictions were as follows:
1. The partner’s viewing perspective would inﬂuence the
Directors’ performance in the memory tasks only when
it had been available in advance. Therefore:
a. When Directors did not know their Matcher’s view-
point while studying the array, they would represent
information from a direction aligned with their
learning viewpoint, given the lack of an intrinsic
structure in our arrays. Thus, in the No Intent and
Intent conditions we expected facilitation of the
Director’s own viewpoint (0).
b. On the other hand, when Directors knew the Match-
er’s viewpoint while studying the array, in the
Co-Presence condition, we expected that spatial
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viewpoint would show distinct processing relative to
other headings. Such distinct processing of the
Matcher’s viewpoint could occur in conjunction with
(rather than in place of) facilitation of the Director’s
viewpoint. Activating multiple perspectives before
selecting one has been observed when interpreting
spatial descriptions in both social tasks (e.g., activat-
ing both the egocentric and partner-centered per-
spective, Duran et al., 2011) and non-social ones
(e.g., simultaneously activating viewer-centered,
object-centered, and environment-centered perspec-
tives, Carlson, 1999; Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin,
1993; Carlson-Radvansky & Logan, 1997; Taylor,
Naylor, Faust, & Holcomb, 1999).
2. The extent to which Directors represented the partner’s
known viewpoint in memory and used it in their
descriptions would depend on the difﬁculty of adopting
that viewpoint.A caveat, here, is that there are different views on
what constitutes difﬁcult perspective-taking in collabo-
rative spatial tasks. Some ﬁndings suggest that perspec-
tive-taking involves mentally rotating to adopt the
partner’s viewpoint (Duran et al., 2011), such that the
further the rotation is from one’s own viewpoint the
more difﬁcult it is (see also Michelon & Zacks, 2006;
Presson & Montello, 1994). Alternatively, the cognitive
cost of perspective-taking may depend, not on the de-
gree of mental rotation, but on whether the adopted
viewpoint is aligned with directions orthogonal to the
preferred direction (e.g., McNamara, 2003). This would
suggest that the oblique offset of 135 would be more
computationally demanding than the larger offset of
180, which is aligned with the Directors’ canonical
axes. Our ﬁndings can clarify the process underlying
adopting the partner’s perspective by indicating when
spatial perspective-taking would more costly for
speakers.
In either case, insofar as partners share responsibil-
ity for mutual understanding and try to minimize the
collective effort of themselves and their partner (Clark,
1996; Clark & Krych, 2004; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs,
1986), we speciﬁcally expected that:
a. Directors would not invest in representing the
Matcher’s viewpoint in memory upon assessing that
adopting it difﬁcult, and would opt to represent spa-
tial information egocentrically (especially since they
could freely interact with them later). Thus, the
extent to which advance information about the part-
ner’s viewpoint is incorporated in memory should
depend on the misalignment between partners.
b. In selecting the perspectives of their descriptions,
Directors wouldn’t merely rely on the memory rep-
resentations they initially constructed, but would
also use perceptual information available in the
communicative situation (i.e., the degree of mis-
alignment between partners). This is consistent with
ﬁndings that, people don’t always adhere to their
memory’s organizing direction when there is a con-
ﬂict between their memory representation and per-
ceptual evidence (e.g., when having to describeobjects from a new viewpoint), but instead use both
sources of information to select the perspective of
their descriptions (Li et al., 2011, Exp. 5).
In general, we expected that when perceptual infor-
mation indicated that perspective-taking would be
demanding for Directors, they would consequently use
more egocentric spatial expressions (perhaps with their
partner’s joint agreement); otherwise, they would use
more partner-centered ones. But we also predicted an
interaction between advance knowledge and perceptual
information about their partner’s viewpoint: since
knowing the partner’s viewpoint in advance could help
speakers assess early on the cognitive demands of the
task on either partner, it could enable them to plan
the perspectives of their descriptions more strategically.Method
Design
Across the three blocks, we manipulated the degree to
which Directors knew about their Matcher’s viewing per-
spective while studying the array (i.e., the salience of the
partner’s perspective) as well the misalignment between
the two participants during the description phase. Across
the three blocks, during the study phase, Directors: (1)
didn’t know that they would have to describe the array
to a Matcher (No Intent condition), (2) knew that they
would have to describe they array to a Matcher, but did
not know what the Matcher’s viewpoint would be (Intent
condition), or (3) knew that they would have to describe
the array to a Matcher and also knew what the Matcher’s
viewpoint would be since the Matcher was co-present in
the room (Co-presence condition). Misalignment for a gi-
ven array was 90, 135, or 180.
Misalignment and array identity were fully counterbal-
anced across pairs of participants. For partner salience,
Directors always studied the ﬁrst array in the No Intent
condition, with the remaining conditions counterbalanced
across pairs of participants to control for practice or carry-
over effects: half the pairs of participants studied and de-
scribed arrays in the order No Intent–Intent–Co-presence,
whereas the remaining pairs in the order No Intent–Co-
presence–Intent, across the three blocks. This gave rise to
18 combinations of the three main factors, each of which
was assigned to a pair of participants. Thus, partner sal-
ience, misalignment and array identity were within-partic-
ipant factors, and the order of partner salience was a
between-participants factor.Participants
Thirty-six college-age students (18 pairs) participated
in exchange for research credit for a psychology course or
for payment. Half of the participants participated as Direc-
tors (9 female and 9 male) and the remaining half as
Matchers (9 female, 9 male). Of the 18 Director–Matcher
pairs, 6 were female–female pairs, 6 were male–male pairs,
and 6 were mixed-gender pairs (with a female Director in
3). Except for four pairs, participants were not previously
Fig. 1. One of the three seven-object arrays used (including a battery,
ﬂashlight, bowl, orange, yoyo, button and vase).
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descriptions of the previously acquainted pairs did not dif-
fer reliably from the rest. All participants were native
speakers of Cypriot Greek.
Materials
Arrays
Conﬁgurations of real objects were displayed on a
70 cm-diameter circular table. Three arrays were used,
one in each block of the experiment. Each array involved
seven common objects that lacked intrinsic front–back
and left–right axes; as a result, most objects were cylindri-
cal, spherical, hemispherical, or otherwise symmetrical in
shape (see Fig. 1 for an example of an array conﬁguration).
Each of the three conﬁgurations were arranged to appear
randomly conﬁgured, without an axis of symmetry or clear
directional structure.2
Set-up
Directors studied arrays of objects and subsequently de-
scribed them to their Matchers in one laboratory room (the
study and description room). JRDs and array drawings
were performed in an adjacent room (the testing room)
to ensure that participants used an enduring off-line spa-
tial representation as opposed to a transient sensorimotor
representation of the arrays (see Avraamides & Kelly, 2008
for a discussion).
In the study and description room, two identical 70 cm-
diameter circular tables were separated by a barrier
(113 cm tall), preventing participants from seeing each
other’s working areas while allowing them to see each2 We used conﬁgurations of arrays that lacked an axis of symmetry since
people consider the array’s intrinsic structure when determining the
preferred direction around which they organize information in memory
(e.g., Li et al., 2011; Mou & McNamara, 2002; Shelton & McNamara, 2001).
In order to examine whether the partner’s known viewpoint is a sufﬁciently
strong cue to inﬂuence the organization of spatial memories (and
subsequent spatial descriptions), we eliminated competing cues (e.g., the
arrays’ intrinsic structure) by constructing arrays with a seemingly random
conﬁguration.other’s faces. To the left of the Director’s chair, which was
always at the same position, was a computer with a joy-
stick, used in the practice phase of JRDs, and a webcam that
video-recorded the Director during the study and descrip-
tion phases. An HD camera behind the Matchers’ table of-
fered a view of the Matcher’s progress in reconstructing
the array during the description phase. The video cameras
yielded digital video–audio ﬁles for each pair for later off-
line analysis of the Directors’ descriptions. Multimodal
information from the videos, including the Directors’ ges-
tures and the Matchers’ progress in reconstructing the lay-
out, was relevant to categorizing spatial expressions that
might have been ambiguous from transcripts alone. Fig. 2
illustrates the set-up in the learning room. The set-up in
the testing room involved two computers with joysticks.
General procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the roles of
Director and Matcher while controlling for gender. When
the Director arrived at the lab, Experimenter 1 (E1) ob-
tained informed consent for participation; participants
could also sign an optional release form for use of their vi-
deo and audio data for scientiﬁc purposes. E1 explained to
Directors that they would have to study arrays of real ob-
jects, memorizing the objects’ position for later memory
tests. Speciﬁcally, Directors were told that in addition to
the memory task, they might have to perform some addi-
tional tasks but were not told explicitly that they would
have to describe the arrays to another participant. Direc-
tors then completed a practice phase, during which they
studied an array of four objects without a time limit to
memorize it. Directors practiced performing JRDs, ﬁrst
through pointing with the hand and with visual access to
the array, and then through pointing with a joystick for tri-
als presented on a computer and without visual access to
the array. On a JRD trial, participants are instructed to
imagine being at one location (station object) facing a sec-
ond (orienting object), and from this imagined heading to
point to a third, the target (e.g., Imagine being at the vase,
facing the orange. Point to the button.).
Once Directors completed the practice phase, they stud-
ied the array for the ﬁrst experimental block without
knowing they would later have to describe it to another
participant (No Intent condition). When Directors indicated
having memorized the array, E1 verbally administered six
JRD trials while Directors wore a blindfold that prevented
visual access to the objects. If needed, Directors could re-
move the blindfold to study the array further. Once E1 en-
sured that Directors had learned the array, they moved to
the testing room to complete JRDs and the drawing task
for that array.
In the meantime, the Matcher, who was scheduled to
arrive 20 min after the Director, was met by Experimenter
2 (E2), who obtained consent, and informed Matchers that
another participant would be describing arrays of objects
to them, which they would have to reconstruct and
memorize for subsequent tests. For their practice phase,
Matchers sat at their table at a 90 offset from E2, who
sat at the Director’s table, and were given four objects to
practice reconstructing a conﬁguration described by E2.
Fig. 2. Set-up in the study and description room, showing the Director’s and Matcher’s working stations, and the locations of recording devices. In this
example of a description phase, the Matcher is at a 90 offset from the Director.
3 The digital photographs provided the veridical positions of the objects
for the array of each Matcher. In other analyses, we use the degree of
distortion of the Matchers’ reconstructions relative to the arrays the
Director had studied to assess the effectiveness of communication strat-
egies between partners.
146 A. Galati et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 68 (2013) 140–159E2, adopting the role of Director, described the four objects
of the practice array (without having them in front of her
and using the same script of descriptions with every
Matcher). E2’s descriptions involved a combination of
descriptions that took explicitly E2’s perspective (e.g., in
front of me) and the Matcher’s perspective (e.g., to your
right), descriptions that took implicitly the Matcher’s per-
spective (e.g. the glue is about 40 cm below the soap), and
descriptions that were neutral (e.g., the soap, the shell,
and the perfume bottle form a right angle; the whole shape
is a trapezoid). Once E2 conﬁrmed that Matchers’ had
reconstructed the practice array correctly, Matchers stud-
ied it without a time limit and then practiced performing
JRDs, ﬁrst through pointing by hand and with visual access
to the objects, and then with a joystick on trials presented
on the computer, without visual access to the objects. After
completing this practice phase, the Matcher and E2 waited
for the Director and E1.
With their consent, Directors returned to the study and
description room to describe to Matchers the array they
had previously studied and on which they had just been
tested. Directors sat at their initial position and Matchers
at the assigned offset for the given block. The instructions
to both participants for the description phase emphasized
that they could interact freely and that they should recon-
struct the array so that, given the Director’s viewpoint, ob-
jects be translated to the Matcher’s table (i.e., not rotated
by the Matcher’s offset). Directors were not restricted in
how they could describe the objects to the Matchers: they
were told that they were free to describe the objects from
their own perspective, their Matcher’s perspective, focuson the relationships between objects, or a combination of
these options. Similarly, Matchers were not restricted in
terms of the kind of feedback they could provide. Their
only restriction was that Directors could not look over
the barrier that separated them to monitor how Matchers
reconstructed the conﬁguration on their table. The experi-
menters turned on the cameras and left the room during
the description phase.
After the participants completed the description phase,
E2 ensured that Matchers had memorized the recon-
structed array through six verbally administered JRDs,
while Matchers wore a blindfold that blocked visual access
to the array. Matchers were then taken by E2 to the testing
room to complete JRDs and the array drawing task. Before
proceeding to the next block, the experimenters took a dig-
ital picture of the reconstructed objects on the Matcher’s
table from a bird’s eye view.3
This sequence of the Director’s study, the Director’s
testing, the description, and the Matcher’s testing phases
was repeated in two more blocks, which differed in the
salience of the Matcher’s perspective during the study
phase and in the misalignment between partners during
the description phase. On the ﬁnal block, when partici-
pants completed their last phase for their role (the descrip-
tion phase for the Director and the testing phase for the
A. Galati et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 68 (2013) 140–159 147Matcher), they were given a brief questionnaire about how
well acquainted they were with the other participant and
were debriefed and compensated with 20 Euros for their
time, if paid. Experimental sessions took about 2 h and
30 min.
Below we provide more detail about the tasks of testing
phase.
Judgment of relative direction
On each trial, participants ﬁrst read a statement in the
form ‘‘Imagine being at x, facing y’’, pressed a button on a
joystick once they adopted that heading, and then re-
sponded to a statement like ‘‘Point to z’’ by deﬂecting the
joystick in the direction of z as if they were facing y and
pressing a button to log in their response. By tapping upon
inter-object relations, JRDs allow us to determine what
preferred direction participants use to organize the spatial
relations in memory (e.g., Kelly, Avraamides, & Loomis,
2007; Kelly, Avraamides, & McNamara, 2010; Shelton &
McNamara, 1997). For each array, 48 JRD trials were pre-
sented individually as text on a computer screen at a com-
fortable distance from the participants. The trials included
eight imagined heading (0, 45, 90, 135, 180, 225, 270,
315) and their order was randomized. In selecting the tri-
als, we aimed to represent equally each combination of
station and orienting objects corresponding to each head-
ing, balancing the number of trials with right and left re-
sponses, and representing objects comparably across
positions (as station points, orienting objects and targets).
The Directors’ orientation and response latencies were
assessed.4 Orientation latency was deﬁned as the time from
the offset of the instruction to adopt an imagined perspec-
tive to the press of the joystick button to indicate that the
imagined perspective was adopted. Response latency was
deﬁned as the time from the offset of the instruction to point
to the target object to the press of the button to log the re-
sponse after deﬂecting the joystick.
Array drawing
The array drawing task required participants to indicate
the position of each object on a gridline circle depicting the
display table, allowing us to assess participants’ memory
for relative positioning of objects and for systematic biases
(e.g., Friedman & Kohler, 2003). Participants were given4 We also recorded pointing error in JRD responses—the unsigned
angular deviation of the joystick response from the veridical response.
We don’t report these analyses, as pointing errors were quite high
(M = 67.92 SD = 60.91). This was not due to a speed-accuracy tradeoff.
Within participants, latency-error correlations did not differ signiﬁcantly
from zero, for neither orientation latency (t (17) = 1.19, p = .25) nor
response latency (t (17) = 1.26, p = .23). And between participants, error
rates were not correlated signiﬁcantly with either orientation latency
(Pearson’s r = .15, p = .56) or response latency (Pearson’s r = .04, p = .89).
Instead, high pointing errors are likely an artifact of joystick mechanics
biasing responses away from the intended bearing. Because the joystick
shaft moves within a square base, reproducing angles at diagonals (i.e., 45,
135, 225, and 315) is easier than other angles. In fact, as some other work
from our lab suggests, angles at diagonals may function as attractors of
responses. The only reliable ﬁnding for pointing error was that, relative to
the ﬁrst block, Directors were more accurate when they knew they would
be subsequently describing the array to a partner: No Intent vs. Intent: F
(1,16) = 16.56, p < .01; No Intent vs. Co-Presence: F (1,16) = 2.64, p = .11.20 cm-diameter grid (with 1 mm lines) and seven circular
transparent markers, each labeled with a name of an ar-
ray’s objects and a dot in the center representing the ob-
ject’s center. Participants were asked to imagine that the
circle represented their table and the labels represented
the objects whose position they had studied and to recon-
struct, as accurately as possible, their conﬁguration. After-
wards, the experimenters marked the position of the dot
for each marker along with the object’s label, and noted
with an arrow at the bottom the participant’s viewing per-
spective while drawing the array.
We performed bidimensional regression analyses to
compare participant’s drawings to the actual object conﬁg-
urations. The measures of interest here were the rotation
parameter (h) and the bidimensional regression coefﬁcient
(BDr). The rotation parameter indicates the extent of rotat-
ing the drawn conﬁguration relative to the viewed array,
thus capturing a potential systematic bias in Directors’
drawings. BDr estimates the goodness-of-ﬁt between the
drawings and the actual coordinates of the arrays, captur-
ing unsystematic error in reconstructions when systematic
biases are accounted for.Transcribing description phases
For each pair, the three description phases were tran-
scribed in detail, including both the Matcher’s and the
Director’s contributions. The transcripts included annota-
tions of ﬁllers (‘‘ehm’’ and ‘‘ee’’, Greek-Cypriot equivalents
of ‘‘um’’ and ‘‘uh’’), pauses, interruptions (both self-inter-
ruptions and interruptions by the Matcher) and restarts.
Instrumental actions performed by the participants (such
as the Matcher correcting the location of an object on the
table) and non-verbal feedback, such as head nods and fa-
cial displays (e.g., frowning to indicate confusion), were
also annotated in the transcripts.Coding the Directors’ descriptions
Spatial expressions
In each transcript, the ﬁrst author identiﬁed and classi-
ﬁed spatial descriptions in the Director’s contributions. We
considered spatial expressions to include (i) locative ad-
verbs, e.g., ‘‘to your right’’ (dheksia su), ‘‘to my left’’ (aristera
mu), ‘‘in between’’ (anamesa), ‘‘next to’’ (dhipla), (ii) geo-
metric shapes and metrics, e.g., ‘‘straight line’’ (efthia), ‘‘tri-
angle’’ (trigono), ‘‘ninety degrees’’ (eneninta mires), (iii)
directional verbs accompanied by a spatial adverb, e.g.,
‘‘go up’’ (pienne pano), (iv) verbs describing spatial rela-
tionships or the movement of objects, e.g., ‘‘move it farther
away a bit’’ (apomakrine to llio), ‘‘it sticks out a bit’’ (eksehi
llio), ‘‘divide the radius of the table’’ (na mirasis tin aktina tu
trapeziu), ‘‘increase the angles’’ (megalos’tes gonies), and (v)
spatial adjectives, e.g., ‘‘distant’’ (apomakrismeno). We ex-
cluded Directors’ spatial expressions that recast a perspec-
tive introduced by the Matcher in the preceding turn,
either verbatim or in a parallel syntactic form (e.g., M17:
‘‘so, for you, it’s supposed to be to your right, isn’t it?’’
D17: ‘‘no, for me, it’s supposed to be in front of me’’).
5 Coders could not be blind to the condition of misalignment between
partners, as this information was critical for classifying implicit person-
centered perspectives.
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classiﬁed spatial expressions in the Directors’ turns as
adopting:
(a) the Director’s perspective, e.g., ‘‘in front of me is the
bracelet’’ (mprosta mu en to vrahioli)
(b) the Matcher’s perspective, e.g. ‘‘the battery is to your
right’’ (i bataria en sta dheksia su)
(c) a Neutral perspective capturing inter-object rela-
tions independent of either participant’s viewpoint,
e.g., ‘‘it’s closer to the ashtray’’ (en pio konta pu to
tasaki) or ‘‘they form a triangle’’ (schematizun trigono)
(d) a perspective other than the Director’s or Matcher’s
(Other heading), e.g., ‘‘say you are at the vase and
directly in front of you is the orange’’ (pes oti ise
sto vazo dje akrivos mprosta su en to portokali).
(e) a perspective that was true for both the Director and
the Matcher (Both-centered), e.g., ‘‘in between us’’
(metaksi mas).
(f) an Environment-centered perspective, relative to
objects or other aspects of the extrinsic environ-
ment, e.g., ‘‘toward my purse’’ (pros ti tsanta mu),
‘‘towards the bookcase’’ (pros ti vivliothiki)
(g) an Object-centered perspective that was relative to
the intrinsic axes of objects, e.g., in reference to the
orange, ‘‘and its belly, let’s say. . .’’ (dje i djilia tu as
pume...)
(h) an Ambiguous perspective for expressions that could
be interpreted as involving more than one of the
above perspectives
Two blocks of the corpus (the last block of Director 7
and the ﬁrst block of Director 8) were excluded from cod-
ing because participants, despite instructions, described
those arrays as if the arrays had been rotated in alignment
with their Matcher. Person-centered expressions in
these blocks were uncodable because, by rotating the
array, the Directors and the Matchers’ perspectives became
indistinguishable.
Note that person-centered expressions were often im-
plicit, and did not involve the use of personal pronouns
(e.g., ‘‘it’s on the left’’, en aristera). In fact, 58% of Direc-
tor-centered and 42% of Matcher-centered spatial expres-
sions were implicit. To determine the implicit perspective
of these cases (as well as in other ambiguous cases), coders
considered multiple sources of information, including: (i)
the known conﬁguration of objects that Directors were
describing, (ii) the misalignment between participants for
that block, (iii) the previous and following discourse con-
text, with special attention to the person-centered per-
spective or system that partners may have already
agreed on, (iv) the Directors’ gestures, (v) the Matchers’
progress in reconstructing the array (especially during
misunderstandings), and (vi) the Director’s drawing of
the array from the associated testing phase (particularly
to establish if Directors were misremembering the array,
in cases where descriptions seemed inaccurate).
Perspective agreement, and preferred perspective
In addition to the distribution of spatial expressions, we
examined:(i) Whether pairs had explicitly agreed on the perspec-
tive from which Directors would describe the array
early in their interaction, before Directors ﬁnished
describing the location of the ﬁrst object.
(ii) The Director’s overall preference in a given block for
a person-centered perspective. For each block, we
computed the proportions of Director-centered and
Matcher-centered expressions, and classiﬁed Direc-
tors as having a particular preference for that block
if proportions exceeded .70 for either category.
Blocks scoring below .70 were classiﬁed as having
a mixed perspective.
Reliability
To assess reliability for the classiﬁcation of spatial
expressions, we had a second coder (blind to the partner
salience condition5) redundantly code approximately 22%
of the corpus (dialogues from 4 pairs), resulting in a total
of 840 judgments. The two coders made identical classiﬁca-
tions of spatial expressions 93% of the time, Kappa = .90,
p < .001, exhibiting almost perfect agreement (see Landis &
Koch, 1977). Diverging coding decisions were resolved by
discussing them until consensus was reached among the
coders.
Analyses
Judgments of relative direction
For the JRD task, partner salience, misalignment, head-
ing, and array identity were within-participant factors,
and the order of partner salience was a between-partici-
pants factor. Array identity will not be considered further
in the reported analyses, as performance across arrays
did not differ signiﬁcantly in terms of orientation latency
(p = .48) or response latency (p = .54). Therefore, unless
indicated otherwise, ANOVAs comparing performance
across partner salience conditions had partner salience
and heading as within-participants factors and partner
salience order as a between-participants factor, while
ignoring misalignment. Effects on misalignment were
assessed for each partner salience condition separately,
with ANOVAs that had misalignment and heading as with-
in-participants factors and partner salience order as a
between-participants factor.
We used planned contrasts to assess performance
across partner salience conditions. Note that we expected
that, in the absence of advance information about the
Matcher’s viewpoint, Directors’ preferred direction of
encoding the array would be largely determined by their
egocentric experience during study. To assess this, we
examined a pattern whereby Directors’ performance
would be facilitated in their encoding (0) heading, would
decrease linearly as imagined headings deviated from this
preferred heading, but also be facilitated at the counter-
aligned heading (a pattern consistent with previous ﬁnd-
ings e.g., Greenauer & Waller, 2008; Hintzman, O’Dell, &
Arndt, 1981; Roskos-Ewoldsen, McNamara, Shelton, & Carr,
A. Galati et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 68 (2013) 140–159 1491998). We represented facilitated performance by ﬁtting
planned contrasts with weights 1.75, 0.75, 0.25, 1.25,
0.25, 1.25, 0.25, 0.75 with the minimum at the 0 heading
(see also Greenauer & Waller, 2008). We examined effect
sizes by evaluating the percent of variance associated with
imagined heading accounted for and unaccounted for by
this contrast (see Keppel & Wickens, 2004).6
Given our prediction that when the Matcher’s view-
point was known in advance, headings aligned with the
Matcher would show distinct processing, for the Co-Pres-
ence condition, we used planned contrasts comparing the
known Matcher’s heading with the Director’s encoding
heading and with the mean of the remaining headings.
Array drawings
We ﬁrst used Friedman and Kohler’s (2003) bidimen-
sional regression tool and recommendations to compare
participants’ drawings to the studied array. We applied a
Euclidean transformation to the veridical array coordinates
in order to extract the variables of interest, the rotation
parameter (h) and bidimensional regression coefﬁcient,
for each participant’s drawings. Then, for h, we asked
whether, for each group of partner salience, there was a
signiﬁcant bias of rotating the drawn array. To examine
this, we computed conﬁdence intervals around the mean
angle for each salience condition using circular statistical
methods, given the angular nature of these data (Upton,
1986). For the No Intent and Intent conditions, where the
Matcher’s perspective was not known at the time of test-
ing, we did not expect such a bias and thus anticipated
the conﬁdence interval of h to include 0. For the Co-Pres-
ence condition, where the Matcher’s perspective was
known in advance, we hypothesized that h may deviate
from 0. To compare the three conditions, we used the
Mardia–Watson–Wheeler nonparametric test because the
rotation parameters in the No Intent condition were bimo-
dally distributed, violating the assumption that all samples
were drawn from populations with a von Mises distribu-
tion (see Batschelet, 1981).
For BDr, we ﬁrst Fisher-transformed individual bidi-
mensional regression coefﬁcients (see also, Friedman &
Montello, 2006), and then analyzed these normalized coef-
ﬁcients (with ANOVAs with partner salience and misalign-
ment as within-participants factors) to determine whether
distortion in the relative positioning of objects differed
when Directors knew in advance their Matchers’ perspec-
tive, and whether the misalignment between the Directors’
and Matchers’ known perspective differentially affected
distortions in the drawn arrays.
Spatial expressions
For the Directors’ descriptions, we performed ANOVAs
on the proportions of the different types of spatial expres-
sions. The type of spatial expression, partner salience,6 The percentage of the variance (un)accounted for is a more meaningful
way of evaluating the planned contrast than F-values, since the contrast is
inherently directional whereas the F-test is not. Patterns of data that depart
greatly from the contrast weights may still be signiﬁcant according an F-
test, so determining whether these departures occur at chance levels (i.e.,
whether the unaccounted for variance is non-signiﬁcant) is informative.misalignment and array identity were within-participant
factors, and the order of partner salience was a between-
participants factor. Array identity will not be considered
further, since the Directors’ choices of spatial expressions
did not differ signiﬁcantly across arrays (p = .97). Main ef-
fects and interactions with the order of partner salience are
not reported unless signiﬁcant.Results
Directors’ judgments of relative direction
We ﬁrst examined the Directors’ spatial memory repre-
sentations, as reﬂected in their performance in the JRD
task. Prior to analyses, outlying latencies (deﬁned as laten-
cies shorter than .5 s and longer than 60 s) were removed,
resulting in .19% of trials being discarded for orientation
latencies and 2.12% of trials for response latencies.Orientation latency
As expected, when Directors didn’t know their Match-
er’s subsequent viewpoint in advance, the misalignment
between partners didn’t inﬂuence their orientation laten-
cies (in the No Intent condition p = .70, in the Intent condi-
tion, p = .46; see Table 1). In the No Intent and Intent
conditions, Directors’ orientation latencies showed facilita-
tion for their encoding viewpoint (0): in these two condi-
tions combined, the Directors’ orientation latencies
differed signiﬁcantly across imagined headings, F
(7,112) = 3.38, p < .01 (assessed by an ANOVA on mean ori-
entation latencies of the two conditions, with heading as a
within-participants factor and partner salience order as a
between subjects factor) and were described adequately
by the planned contrast with 0 as the preferred heading,
F (1,17) = 5.82, p < .05. This planned contrast accounted
for 21.22% of the variance associated with the imagined
heading, leaving a non-signiﬁcant amount of variance
unaccounted for (p = .47). Fig. 3a and b illustrate that ori-
entation latencies in the No Intent and Intent conditions
increased linearly as headings deviated from 0, with the
exception of 180, which also showed facilitation.
As Fig. 3c shows, orientation latencies across headings
patterned differently in the Co-Presence condition than
the other conditions. To understand this pattern better
we considered performance across the three levels of mis-
alignment for the Co-Presence condition (misalignment
did not affect orientation latencies overall, p = .96). When
Directors knew their Matcher would be offset by 90 or
135, they were slower to orient to headings aligned with
their Matcher relative to their own, F (1,8) = 6.98, p < .05,
and marginally so relative to other headings, F
(1,8) = 3.95, p = .08 (see Fig. 4a and b). This wasn’t the case
when Directors knew their Matcher would be counter-
aligned with them (see Fig. 4c): at the180 offset, their
latencies to orient to headings aligned with the Matcher
did not differ reliably from either those aligned with their
own (p = .34) or other headings (p = .31).
Overall, Directors were faster to orient to imagined
headings after the ﬁrst block, when they knew they would














































150 A. Galati et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 68 (2013) 140–159No Intent condition Directors took 8.77 (SD = 6.98) s to ori-
ent to a particular heading, whereas they took an average
of 7.52 (SD = 6.16) s in the Intent and 7.79 (SD = 5.88) s in
Co-Presence conditions. Performance in these latter condi-
tions differed from the No Intent condition (Intent vs. No
Intent: F (1,16) = 3.95, p = .06, Co-Presence vs. No Intent:
F (1,16) = 4.53, p < .05). These differences are consistent
with an effect of practice (linear trend across blocks, F
(1,17) = 6.09, p < .05), which is further corroborated by
the interaction between partner salience and partner sal-
ience order when contrasting the Intent and Co-Presence
conditions, F (1,16) = 5.14, p < .05. In the No Intent–In-
tent–Co-Presence order, Directors were faster to orient to
imagined headings in the Co-Presence condition in the
third block than the Intent condition in the second block
(7.57 vs. 7.93 s). The reverse was true in No Intent–Co-Pres-
ence–Intent order: Directors were faster to orient to imag-
ined headings in the Intent condition in the third block
than in the Co-Presence condition in the second block
(7.11 vs. 8.02 s).5
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Fig. 3. Orientation latencies (in sec) of the Director across imagined
headings, for each of the conditions of partner salience: No Intent (a),
Intent (b), and Co-Presence (c). Bars represent standard errors of the
mean.Response latency
As expected, when Directors didn’t know about their
Matcher’s subsequent viewpoint in advance, their response
latencies were not affected by the degree of misalignment
between partners (for No Intent: p = .97; for Intent:
p = .46). Like orientation latencies, response latencies
showed facilitation along a preferred direction aligned
with 0. For the combined No Intent and Intent conditions,
the mean response latencies differed signiﬁcantly across
headings, F (7,112) = 8.50, p < .001. The planned contrast
with 0 as the preferred heading described performance
adequately, F (1,17) = 20.93, p < .001, accounting for
47.07% of the variance associated with the imagined head-
ing and leaving a non-signiﬁcant amount of variance unac-
counted for (p = .69). As Fig. 5a and b illustrate, response
latencies were shorter from the encoding (0) heading,
increasing linearly as headings deviated from it.
When Directors knew their Matcher’s viewpoint in ad-
vance, response latencies across imagined headings dif-
fered signiﬁcantly, F (7,84) = 4.19, p < .01, but they did
not show the same pattern as orientation latencies.
Regardless the misalignment between partners, Directors
were signiﬁcantly slower to respond from headings aligned
with their Matcher’s subsequent viewpoint relative to
headings aligned with their own, F (1,12) = 7.42, p < .05,Table 1
Means (and standard deviations) of the orientation and response latencies




No Intent 9.81 (6.94) 7.58 (5.29) 8.93 (8.25)
Intent 6.50 (4.29) 8.79 (7.92) 7.27 (5.51)
Co-Presence 7.56 (6.70) 7.73 (4.63) 8.10 (6.15)
Response latencies
No Intent 5.62 (4.66) 5.71 (4.87) 6.01 (7.02)
Intent 3.80 (2.99) 4.89 (4.50) 4.57 (4.28)
Co-Presence 4.93 (5.25) 3.90 (2.75) 5.39 (3.56)but not relative to other non-egocentric headings
(p = .36). As Fig. 6a–c illustrate, a cost of responding from
the Matcher’s known perspective held numerically only
when Directors knew Matchers would be offset by 135
(Fig. 6b); however, response latencies from that known
heading did not differ signiﬁcantly from either the Direc-
tor’s own heading, F (1,4) = 2.87, p = .17, or the remaining
headings, F (1,4) = 3.28, p = .14. Instead, Directors’ re-
sponse latencies suggested that they represented arrays
from a preferred direction aligned with their encoding
viewpoint (see Fig. 5c): the planned contrast representing
a preferred direction aligned with 0 was signiﬁcant, F
(1,17) = 15.61, p < .01, accounting for 58.22% of the vari-
ance associated with the imagined heading and leaving a


















































































Fig. 4. Orientation latencies (in sec) of the Director in the Co-Presence
condition across imagined headings for each of the misalignment













































































Fig. 5. Response latencies (in sec) of the Director across imagined
headings, for each of the conditions of partner salience: No Intent (a),
Intent (b), and Co-Presence (c). Bars represent standard errors of the
mean.
A. Galati et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 68 (2013) 140–159 151Directors were faster, not only to orient to, but also to
respond from imagined viewpoints after the ﬁrst block,
when they knew they would be describing the studied ar-
rays to a Matcher (linear trend across blocks: F
(1,17) = 5.29, p < .05). In the No Intent condition Directors
took an average of 5.78 (SD = 5.62) s to respond from imag-
ined headings, whereas they took an average of 4.41
(SD = 3.99) s in the Intent and 4.72 (SD = 4.05) s in Co-Pres-
ence conditions. As with orientation latencies, when Direc-
tors knew about the subsequent description, whether they
knew their Matcher’s viewpoint or not, they were faster to
respond from an imagined heading than when they didn’tknow about the description (Intent vs. No Intent: F
(1,16) = 4.93, p < .05, Co-Presence vs. No Intent: F
(1,16) = 5.41, p < .05). Since salience order did not interact
with partner salience, faster response times after the ﬁrst
block could be either due to practice or communicative
intent.
Directors’ array drawings
As we predicted, when Directors did not know their
Matchers’ viewpoint in advance, there was no evidence
of a systematic bias in rotating their array drawings: con-
ﬁdence intervals for the mean rotation parameter in the
No Intent and Intent condition included 0: for No Intent,
h = 0.905, r = 0.897, 95% CI [16.103,17.897]; for Intent
h = 0.199, r = 0.995, 95% CI [2.801,3.199]. On the other
hand, when they did know their Matchers’ viewpoint in











































































Fig. 6. Response latencies (in sec) of the Director in the Co-Presence
condition across imagined headings for each of the misalignment
conditions: 90 (a), 135 (b), and 180 (c). Bars represent standard errors
of the mean.
7 Other-heading expressions appear to be unique to our corpus (cf.,
Schober, 1993, 1995, 2009; Shelton & McNamara, 2004) likely arising from
the memory tasks that always preceded descriptions. The format of JRD
trials may have served as an available strategy for Directors when
describing objects, cueing them to adopt imagined headings other than
their Matcher’s or their own. Most of the 219 Other-heading expressions in
the corpus (71% of them) were produced by three Directors: Other-heading
expressions accounted for an average of 24% of the spatial expressions of
Director 3, 17% of Director 6, and 19% of Director 16.
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dence interval did not include 0, 95% CI [1.281,9.281]. This
indicates that Director’s drawings were slightly rotated
clockwise, towards the Matcher’s known viewpoint. The
rotational bias in array drawings differed reliably across
the three partner salience conditions: the Mardia–
Watson–Wheeler nonparametric test revealed a signiﬁcant
effect of partner salience, v2MWWð3Þ ¼ 25:01, p < .05.
Advance knowledge of the Matcher’s viewpoint did not,
by itself, lead to signiﬁcantly more distortion in the relative
positioning of objects, as assessed by ANOVAs on the Fisher-
transformed bidimensional regression coefﬁcient (BDr): No
Intent vs. Co-Presence: p = .60; No Intent vs. Co-Presence:
p = .24. In fact, array drawings in all conditions of partner
salience involved signiﬁcant distortion in the relative posi-
tioning of objects, with the BDr differing signiﬁcantly from1 (No Intent: BDr = .96, SD = .05, t (17) = 3.50, p < .01; In-
tent:BDr = .96, SD = .03, t (17) = 3.37, p < .01; Co-Presence:
BDr = .95, SD = .06, t (17) = 3.37, p < .01). Nonetheless,
when Directors knew in advance that they would be misa-
ligned by 90 from their Matchers, their array drawings
were signiﬁcantly more distorted than in the Intent and
No Intent conditions: No Intent vs. Co-Presence 95% CI
[.266,1.146], p < .01; Intent vs. Co-Presence 95% CI
[.147,1.027], p < .05. Additionally, in the Co-Presence condi-
tion, array drawings were marginally more distorted when
Directors knew in advance that Matchers would be at 135
than at 180, 95% CI [.991, .071], p = .09.
Thus, knowing the Matcher’s viewpoint in advance led
to a reliable rotational bias in array drawings towards the
Matcher and affected, in some respects, the distortion of
the relative positions of objects.
Directors’ descriptions
Distribution of spatial expressions
Directors produced most frequently Neutral expres-
sions in their descriptions (46% of all 3844 spatial expres-
sions), with Director-centered and Matcher-centered
expressions next (19% and 23%, respectively), and with
Ambiguous and Other-heading7 expressions together
accounting about 11% of the corpus. Because expressions
from Both-centered, Environment-centered and Intrinsic
perspectives constituted less than 2% of all spatial expres-
sions, we don’t consider them further in subsequent analy-
ses. The mean proportion of Neutral expressions was
signiﬁcantly higher than those of every other type (vs.
Director-centered: F (1,51) = 42.85, p < .001; vs. Matcher-
centered: F (1,51) = 58.35, p < .001; vs. Other-heading: F
(1,51) = 323.87, p < .001; vs. Ambiguous: F (1,51) = 405.65,
p < .001). Director-centered and Matcher-centered expres-
sions did not differ reliably in their frequency (p = .74), but
were both more frequent than expressions from Other-
headings, (Director-centered vs. Other: F (1,51) = 20.25,
p < .001; Matcher-centered vs. Other: F (1,51) = 37.28,
p < .001) and from Ambiguous expressions (Director-
centered vs. Ambiguous: F (1,51) = 26.81, p < .001; Matcher-
centered vs. Ambiguous: F (1,51) = 48.05, p < .001).
Themisalignment between partners affected speciﬁcally
the distribution of Director-centered or Matcher-centered
expressions, rather than the overall distribution of spatial
expressions. When Directors were at relatively small offset
from their Matchers (90), they produced reliably more
Matcher-centered descriptions than when offset by 135
(28% vs. 17%), F (1,14) = 17.30, p < .01, and marginally so
than when offset by 180 (28% vs. 20%), F (1,14) = 2.92,
p = .11. On the other hand, when they were offset by the
















































































































Fig. 7. Mean proportion of Director-centered and Matcher-centered
expressions across misalignment conditions, for each of the conditions
of partner salience: No Intent (9a), Intent (9b), and Co-Presence (9c). Bars
represent standard errors of the mean.
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(1,14) = 11.20, p < .01, and marginally so than when offset
by 180 (25% vs. 12%), F (1,14) = 3.04, p = .10. The distribu-
tion of these person-centered expressions at different de-
grees of misalignment accounts for the overall interaction
between the type of spatial expression and misalignment,
F (8,112) = 2.57, p < .05.
To unpack further Directors’ preferences for these per-
son-centered expressions, we considered their distribution
across the different degrees of misalignment for each con-
dition of partner salience separately (see Fig. 7a–c). As
Fig. 7c shows, Directors’ preference for egocentric expres-
sions at the 135 was largely driven by the Co-Presence
condition. When Directors knew in advance that their
Matcher would be offset by 135 they used more Direc-
tor-centered expressions than when they knew their
Matcher would be offset by 90, F (1,11) = 5.01, p < .05,
and marginally so than when offset by 180, F (1,11) =
3.94, p = .07. The preference for Director-centered
expressions at 135 in the Co-Presence condition was
accompanied by a numerical but not reliable drop in
Matcher-centered expressions (proportions of Matcher-
centered expressions at 135 vs. 90, F (1,11) = 3.44,
p = .09, and vs. 180, F (1,11) = 3.01, p = .11). Directors’ lin-
guistic choices at the 135 offset contextualize their prefer-
ence for Director-centered over Matcher-centered
expressions in the Co-Presence condition (25% vs. 19%).
Directors were also more likely to produce Ambiguous
expressions the ﬁrst time they described an array, in the
No Intent condition, than in the Co-Presence condition
(7% vs. 4%), F (1,14) = 9.87, p < .01, or the Intent condition
(7% vs. 4%), F (1,14) = 4.52, p = .05. No other patterns in
Directors’ spatial expressions were reliable.
Perspective agreement
To contextualize the distribution of expressions re-
ported in the previous section, we also considered when
pairs explicitly agreed from whose perspective Directors
would describe the arrays. Of the 54 experimental blocks
(across the 18 pairs), participants explicitly agreed on the
perspective that Directors would adopt in 21 of them. Part-
ners agreed more frequently on a perspective when Direc-
tors had already known they would be interacting with a
Matcher, after the ﬁrst block. They agreed on a perspective
in only 28% of the blocks in the No Intent condition com-
pared to 44% of the blocks in each of the Intent and in
the Co-Presence conditions.
Pairs also agreed more frequently on a perspective
when they were offset by the oblique 135, especially
when pairs had known this in advance: in the Co-Presence
condition, pairs agreed on a perspective 66% of the time
when they knew they would be misaligned by 135 (vs.
33% when they knew they would be offset by 90 or
180). Within those agreements, partners opted for the
Director’s (vs. their Matcher’s) perspective more frequently
when misaligned by 135 (78% of the time) than when mis-
aligned by 180 or 90 (67% and 50% of the time, respec-
tively). In fact, when pairs knew in advance that they
would be misaligned by 135, it was the Matchers who
most frequently proposed that Directors should use their
own perspective (on 75% of those agreements). Thus, whenpartners had known in advance that they would be misa-
ligned by 135, they were especially likely to agree on
using the Director’s perspective, most often following the
Matcher’s own initiative.
Directors’ perspective preference
In half of the 52 blocks for which spatial expressions
were codable Directors were classiﬁed as having mixed
preference for Director-centered and Matcher-centered
expressions. Of the remaining 26 blocks, in 16 Directors
showed preference for the Matcher’s perspective and in
10 for their own. Table 2 shows the distribution of blocks
across misalignment and partner salience conditions, in
which Directors showed a preference for their own, the
Matcher’s, or else a mixed perspective. Notably, in 56% of
the blocks for which Directors preferred their Matcher’s
Table 2
Distribution of blocks, by misalignment and by partner salience, in which
Directors showed a preference for their own or their Matcher’s perspective








90 2 9 6
135 6 4 8
180 2 3 12
No Intent 1 6 10
Intent 4 5 9
Co-Presence 5 5 7
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er, and in 60% of the blocks for which they preferred their
own viewpoint they were misaligned by 135 from their
Matcher. The difference in the distribution of Directors’
preferred perspective across conditions of misalignment
was almost signiﬁcant: v2 (4) = 9.23, p = .056. The distribu-
tion of preferred perspectives was not affected signiﬁ-
cantly by the salience of the Matcher’s perspective
(p = .51).Synthesis of results
To help formulate a clearer picture of how advance
knowledge of a misaligned partner’s viewpoint inﬂuences
memory and behavior, in this section, we summarize and
integrate across data patterns from the Directors’ memory
performance and their descriptions.
A ﬁrst observation is that knowing the partner’s view-
point in advance impacted various aspects of the Directors’
memory performance. When Directors knew their Match-
er’s subsequent viewpoint while studying arrays, they
showed a bias in rotating their array drawings toward their
Matcher’s viewpoint and showed distinctive processing in
JRDs, taking longer to orient to perspectives aligned with
their Matcher relative to other non-egocentric perspectives
(at least when offset by 90 and 135). On the other hand,
when Directors didn’t know their Matcher’s viewpoint
while studying arrays, they encoded them egocentrically:
they did not show a rotational bias in their array drawings,
and in the JRD task they showed facilitation orienting to
and responding from perspectives aligned with their own.
Directors adapted their descriptions somewhat differ-
ently than their memory performance depending on what
they knew at the time of study. Whereas in the memory
tasks Directors encoded arrays egocentrically when they
did not know their Matcher’s viewpoint at the time of
study (being faster to orient to and respond from perspec-
tives aligned with their own, and not rotating their array
drawings), they were no more likely to subsequently de-
scribe arrays from their own perspective. And conversely,
when they knew the Matcher’s viewpoint in advance,
Directors were no more likely to subsequently describe ar-
rays from their Matcher’s perspective. Instead, the per-
spective of Directors’ descriptions depended largely on
perceptual cues available during the description phase:
speciﬁcally, on the misalignment between partners. WhenDirectors were misaligned by 135 from their Matcher,
they were more likely to use egocentric descriptions than
at other offsets. And when Directors were misaligned by
90 from their Matcher, they were more likely to use part-
ner-centered descriptions than at other offsets. Similarly,
the Directors’ overall preference for a particular perspec-
tive throughout their description differed according to
their misalignment from their Matcher, not according to
what they knew at study.
Nonetheless, knowing their degree of misalignment
from their Matcher in advance led Directors to strategic
perspective choices in their descriptions. Their overall
preference of their own perspective at the 135 offset
was in fact driven by the Co-Presence condition: when
they had known in advance that the Matcher would be off-
set by the oblique 135, they were more likely to use ego-
centric expressions and numerically less likely to use
partner-centered ones than at other offsets. This prefer-
ence of the Director’s perspective at this known oblique
offset was shared with the Matcher, since pairs in this sce-
nario were especially likely to explicitly agree on using the
Director’s perspective.
In sum, although Directors adapted their memory rep-
resentations when they had known their Matcher’s view-
point in advance, they did not simply rely on these
representations to determine the perspective of their
descriptions. Instead, Directors used perceptual cues avail-
able during the description phase (their misalignment
from their Matcher), pertinent to their and their Matcher’s
respective cognitive demands of perspective-taking, to
adapt strategically the perspective of their descriptions.
Advance knowledge of the Matcher’s viewpoint facilitated
these strategic choices by enabling pairs to recognize when
perspective-taking would be most difﬁcult for Directors
(presumably at 135) and to agree on a perspective that
would alleviate their cognitive load.Discussion
Our ﬁndings present a consistent picture regarding how
people represent their conversational partner’s viewpoint
in spatial memory and how, in turn, they use that informa-
tion during linguistic processing. First, when the partner’s
viewpoint is available, speakers encode it in spatial repre-
sentations. However, whether they use it as the preferred
organizing direction of their spatial representations de-
pends on the attributions they make about their partner’s
ability to contribute to the communicative task. Second,
when describing spatial information, speakers don’t rely
exclusively on the organizing direction of their spatial rep-
resentations, but also use partner-speciﬁc information that
is perceptually available in the communicative task. Final-
ly, upon considering both perceptual and in advance infor-
mation relevant to their partner’s viewpoint, speakers
adapt their spatial descriptions strategically in ways that
minimize their collective effort. Our study clariﬁes when
spatial perspective-taking is most demanding for speakers
and how they negotiate their description strategies with
their partner. We expound on each of these points in the
following subsections.
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In our study, in the absence of advance information
about their Matcher’s viewpoint, when making spatial
judgments, Directors were faster to orient to and respond
from headings aligned with their own learning viewpoint.
As expected, since neither the arrays nor their constituent
objects offered intrinsic axes of symmetry as organizing
cues, Directors used their own viewpoint to organize spa-
tial relations in memory. However, when Directors knew
their Matchers’ viewpoint in advance, perspectives aligned
with the Matchers’ viewpoint showed distinct processing,
though this depended on the misalignment between part-
ners. When Directors knew they would be misaligned but
not counteraligned with their Matcher (i.e., at 90 and
135), they tended to be slower to orient to headings
aligned with their Matcher. This slower orienting suggests,
that, in recalling an episodic trace for their experience from
studying arrays (which includes the Matcher’s position and
orientation at their workstation), Directors incurred a pro-
cessing cost. This cost may be either due to relating during
testing these imagined headings (based on inter-object
relations) to the Matcher’s external viewpoint, or due to
retrieving these headings from a richer representation al-
ready linking them to Matcher’s viewpoint. Directors also
showed a signiﬁcant bias in their array drawings when
they knew their Matcher’s viewpoint in advance, rotating
their drawings towards the Matcher. At the same time,
Directors’ response latencies suggest that they represented
in memory not only the partner’s known viewpoint but
also their own, since they were fastest to locate target ob-
jects from perspectives aligned with their learning view-
point. That participants simultaneously represented both
viewpoints in memory is compatible with ﬁndings that
people co-activate their partner’s and their own perspec-
tive before ultimately selecting one (Duran et al., 2011).
As we have shown, although the partner’s spatial view-
point is encoded in memory when known in advance, it is
not necessarily used as an organizing direction for the spa-
tial relationships among array objects (cf. Shelton & McNa-
mara, 2004). Why might this be so? Our study suggests
that using the partner’s viewpoint as a preferred organiz-
ing direction requires strong pragmatic motivation:
whether people invest the cognitive effort to organize spa-
tial relations around their partner’s viewpoint depends on
the attributions they make about their partner’s ability to
contribute to the task. Our ﬁndings, alongside those from
Shelton and McNamara’s (2004) related study, highlight
that people’s attributions about their partner’s ability to
coordinate with them inﬂuence whether they incorporate
their partner’s viewpoint in memory. In Shelton and McNa-
mara (2004), Directors had been explicitly instructed to ac-
tively take their Matchers’ perspective when they learned
the array (while describing it), and were further motivated
to adopt that perspective by not being able to freely inter-
act with their Matchers and by knowing that their Match-
ers didn’t know their viewpoint relative to the array. Under
these conditions, where the partner was restricted in inter-
preting or responding to their descriptions, speakers used
the partner’s viewpoint as a preferred organizing direction
for encoding arrays. On the other hand, in our study, Direc-tors in the Co-Presence condition knew at the time of study
that the Matcher’s viewpoint would be perceptually avail-
able during the description, that their own viewpoint
would be perceptually available to the Matcher, and that
they could interact freely. Under these conditions, the
attributions that speakers made about their partner’s abil-
ity to coordinate with them likely discouraged them from
investing the cognitive resources to organize spatial rela-
tions in memory around their partner’s viewpoint, and
led them to simply encode that viewpoint and use it later
ﬂexibly and as needed.
In our view, attributions about the partner are more rel-
evant to predicting perspective-taking behavior than how
information about the partner’s perspective actually comes
about—whether through co-presence, explicit instructions,
or schematic diagrams. When people assess that their part-
ner’s ability to coordinate is limited, they use the partner’s
viewpoint as an organizing direction, even if that view-
point is indicated merely with an arrow around the speak-
er’s to-be-learned spatial conﬁguration (Shelton &
McNamara, 2004). Similarly, depending on what they be-
lieve about their partner’s ability to contribute, they adapt
their descriptions (Schober, 1993, 2009) and the temporal
and trajectory dynamics of their responses (Duran et al.,
2011), even when the partner’s viewpoint is depicted as
an arrow in a schematic 2-D display (e.g., of a table with
objects).
Altogether, our ﬁndings on Directors’ memory perfor-
mance are in line with the view that perspective-taking in
dialogue is supported by ordinary cognitive processes act-
ing on memory representations (e.g., Horton & Gerrig,
2002, 2005; Metzing & Brennan, 2003). According to this
memory-based view of partner-speciﬁc adaptation, infor-
mation about the partner can be represented in memory
and affect perspective-taking when it is available and easily
maintained, but not when it isn’t available early enough
(Kraljic & Brennan, 2005) or requires complex inferences
(Gerrig et al., 2000). Here, we demonstrate that even the
availability of such relevant, a priori information about
the partner inﬂuences the spatial memory representations
that speakers construct. When the partner’s viewpoint is
salient and available in advance, people encode it in spatial
memory, but when it is unavailable they organize spatial
information in memory according to egocentric experience.Selecting the perspective of spatial descriptions: using
in advance vs. perceptual information about the
partner’s viewpoint
Although people can encode partner-speciﬁc informa-
tion in spatial memory, we have shown that when describ-
ing spatial information to a partner they don’t solely rely
on how their memory representations are organized. Ad-
vance knowledge of the partner’s viewpoint does not
determine on its own the preferred perspective of
speakers’ descriptions. Instead, speakers select the pre-
ferred perspective of their descriptions upon considering
information from their shared perceptual experience dur-
ing collaboration. Directors considered the degree of mis-
alignment from their Matcher, available in the immediate
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gically, upon considering the cognitive demands on both
partners. They did not necessarily use more partner-cen-
tered descriptions when they had known their partner’s
viewpoint in advance, and conversely they did not use
more egocentric descriptions when information about the
partner’s viewpoint was unavailable at the time of study.
Instead, they used partner-centered expressions more of-
ten at a small offset (at 90), and egocentric expressions
more often at the oblique 135. Preference of the Directors’
perspective was especially pronounced when pairs knew
in advance that they would be offset by 135, with Direc-
tors often explicitly agreeing with their Matcher to adopt
their own perspective. Directors’ overall perspective pref-
erences were also consistent with this pattern: when
Directors preferred overall their Matcher’s perspective,
they did so more frequently when misaligned by 90 with
their Matcher, whereas when they preferred their own per-
spective, they did so more frequently when misaligned by
135. Directors used mixed perspectives more frequently
when they were counteraligned with their Matcher, sug-
gesting that when sharing a canonical axis, people are
more likely to alternate ﬂexibly between descriptions from
their own and their partner’s perspective.
That speakers relied heavily on partner-speciﬁc infor-
mation perceptually available during the interaction, while
also considering whether this information was known in
advance, is consistent with Li et al.’s (2011) ﬁnding that
speakers use both perceptual information and their mem-
ories to select the perspective of their descriptions. In that
study, speakers’ perceptual viewpoint inﬂuenced the per-
spective they selected to verbally locate objects, even
though they preserved their initial direction in memory
(as corroborated by a set of JRDs, after verbally locating ob-
jects). Thus, both studies underscore that the way spatial
information is encoded does not dictate how it will be sub-
sequently described; perceptual information available dur-
ing the description also inﬂuences the selection of a
preferred perspective. Beyond Li et al. (2011), our own
work underscores that in a social setting, such perceptual
information shapes strategically the perspective of speak-
ers’ descriptions, according to partners’ assessment of their
relative cognitive demands.Selecting the perspective of spatial descriptions:
cognitive demands and joint agreements
We have shown that speakers use both perceptually
available and in advance information to adapt their
descriptions, presumably on the basis of attributions
regarding the demands of perspective-taking on each part-
ner. Since in our study the partners’ respective viewpoints
were perceptually available to one another during the
description and they could interact freely, the burden of
perspective-taking wasn’t exclusively on Directors. When
perspective-taking was difﬁcult for Directors, they could
alleviate some of their cognitive burden by describing spa-
tial information from their own perspective, having their
Matchers unpack the spatial mappings of these Director-
centered descriptions.Our study affords a novel contribution regarding when
spatial perspective-taking is most demanding for speakers.
It suggests that, at least when generating spatial descrip-
tions, perspective-taking is more computationally
demanding for speakers when they are misaligned by the
oblique 135 offset than by the maximum offset of 180
from their partner. Directors were more likely to use ego-
centric expressions at 135 than at 90, but no more likely
to do so at 180; in fact they were marginally less likely to
use egocentric expressions at 180 than at 135. Earlier
studies have reported similarities in speakers’ descriptions
at different offsets: for instance, speakers describing arrays
to misaligned partners used partner-centered expressions
with comparable frequency, regardless of the degree of
misalignment (Schober, 1993, 1995). However, our study
suggests that these similarities may be limited to the
orthogonal offsets used in these studies. Our ﬁndings are
in line with McNamara’s (2003) proposal that perspectives
aligned with one’s canonical axes are facilitated relative to
oblique ones, and suggest that when describing spatial
information, speakers do not simply mentally rotate the
array to consider their partner’s viewpoint (cf. Duran
et al.’s, 2011, conclusions based on only orthogonal offsets
between partners during the interpretation of spatial
descriptions).
Notably, the demands of perspective-taking did not af-
fect speakers’ memory representations in the same way
as their descriptions. For example, when speakers knew
in advance that perspective-taking would be difﬁcult for
them, with the partner at 135, they didn’t simply ignore
their partner’s viewpoint but rather invested the cognitive
effort to represent it in memory, even if they later opted for
their own perspective in descriptions.
Together, these ﬁndings suggest that advance knowl-
edge of the other’s perspective enables partners to mutu-
ally recognize when the communicative situation would
be more difﬁcult for each partner and to adapt their strat-
egies in ways maximizing the efﬁciency of communication.
When perspective-taking was relatively easy for Directors
they did what was easier for their Matcher, adopting the
Matcher’s perspective. On the other hand, when perspec-
tive-taking was difﬁcult for Directors, partners mutually
recognized this, with Matchers agreeing often explicitly
on Directors using their own perspective—a strategy that
was harder for them but easier for their partner. Partners
ﬂexibly shared responsibility for mutual understanding,
consistent with ﬁndings that when partners recognize that
one partner is likely to ﬁnd the interaction difﬁcult, the
other will invest greater cognitive effort to ensure mutual
understanding while minimizing their collective effort
(e.g., Bortfeld & Brennan, 1997; Clark, 1996; Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).
Elsewhere, we have shown that the partners’ descrip-
tion choices were successful at minimizing their collective
effort (Galati & Avraamides, 2012). Additional analyses of
the dialogues of the present corpus indicated that pairs
took fewer conversational turns (i.e., uninterrupted
stretches of speech by a partner) to reconstruct the arrays
when Directors knew in advance that they would be misa-
ligned by 135—where, as we show here, they had fre-
quently described arrays from their own viewpoint—
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expressions Directors used the fewest turns pairs needed
to coordinate. Thus, insofar as conversational turns reﬂect
the pairs’ difﬁculty in monitoring and coordinating their
behavior (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), their agreed
upon description strategies when perspective-taking was
difﬁcult for Directors indeed facilitated their coordination.
In the present work, we have focused on global adjust-
ments of speakers’ behavior—on speakers’ spatial repre-
sentations and on the overall distribution of their
descriptions’ perspectives. This raises the question of
whether the adjustments we observed in speakers’
descriptions reﬂect purely early (or a priori) choices for
the perspective they assessed would minimize collabora-
tive effort, or whether they were also shaped adaptively
by the partner’s feedback. To address this question, in fol-
low-up analyses, we examined whether global, long-last-
ing switches in the person-centered perspective of
Directors’ descriptions were prompted by the Matchers’ lo-
cal feedback. We did not ﬁnd such evidence: long-lasting
switches in the Directors’ person-centered perspective
were not prevalent (occurring in 9 of the 52 codable blocks,
often when recapping the array conﬁguration) and were
often self-initiated (only four of these switches could be
unambiguously attributed to the Matcher). Most of the
time, Directors used a consistent person-centered perspec-
tive throughout their descriptions (in 33 blocks); other-
wise, they either alternated back and forth between the
Director and Matcher’s perspectives or opted for a non-
person-centered perspective.
The paucity of global perspective-switches prompted by
Matchers, along with our ﬁndings on partners’ initial
agreement on a perspective, suggest that the Matchers’
feedback is most impactful at the beginning of the interac-
tion, when discussing the perspective the Director should
adopt. This is not to say that after that initial agreement
speakers don’t respond adaptively to their partners’ pro-
posals. When Matchers’ proposals adopted a different per-
son-centered perspective, we observed that Directors often
reused that perspective locally in response, but typically
resumed descriptions from the perspective previously
used. But most frequently, the Matchers’ clariﬁcation ques-
tions and proposals were consistent with the person-cen-
tered perspective already in use, or were otherwise
neutral (e.g., inquiries about the distance, shape, or bearing
between objects). Using a perspective that is locally consis-
tent with that used by the partner contributes to quickly
establishing an effective description scheme with the min-
imum collaborative effort (Garrod & Anderson, 1987).
Although under some circumstances switching perspec-
tives can be effective for coordinating (Brennan & Clark,
1996; Tversky, Lee, & Mainwaring, 1999), partners in col-
laborative spatial tasks generally abide to a consistent spa-
tial perspective upon establishing an explicit or implicit
conceptual pact.Conclusion
To summarize, perspective-taking is affected both by
the extent to which adopting the partner’s perspective iscomputationally demanding and the extent to which
information about the partner’s perspective is available
in advance. When adopting perspectives aligned with
their partner, people access their partner’s viewpoint from
episodic traces and relate it to pertinent representations
of spatial information. Although people can encode the
partner’s known viewpoint in memory, they need prag-
matic motivation to use it as a preferred organizing direc-
tion for spatial relations: if they assess that their partner’s
ability to contribute to the interaction is limited, they will
use it as an organizing direction (Shelton & McNamara,
2004), whereas if they assess that their partner is uncon-
strained in contributing to the interaction, they won’t do
so. Critically, even though people incorporate partner-spe-
ciﬁc information in memory when it is available, they use
this information opportunistically and strategically when
collaborating in spatial tasks. They use this information,
along with other information from their perceptual envi-
ronment, to gauge the demands of perspective-taking on
each partner and adapt accordingly their perspective
choices when describing spatial relations. This assessment
affects their overall preference for a given perspective, the
distribution of perspectives in their expressions, and the
extent to which they explicitly agree on such a preference
with their partner. These ﬁndings underscore that simple
but relevant cues about the partner (e.g., the partner’s
location in space and, by extension, the relative difﬁculty
of reasoning from their perspective) can be used ﬂexibly
to affect behavior (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Galati &
Brennan, 2010). Determining that the partner’s perspec-
tive is relatively easy to adopt, whether through advance
information or perceptual evidence, leads to readily
adopting it, whereas determining that it is computation-
ally demanding (especially through advance information)
leads to other choices that maximize the efﬁciency of
communication.
Spatial perspective-taking, thus, does not simply de-
pend on whether people know the degree to which their
partner’s perspective departs from their own, but instead
depends on the attributions they make about their respec-
tive ability to contribute to mutual understanding. In this
respect, spatial perspective-taking in communicative tasks
is not unlike other kinds of non-spatial perspective-taking
where conversational partners may have different concep-
tual perspectives or background knowledge. For both spa-
tial and non-spatial perspective-taking, partners consider
their respective demands in adopting the other’s perspec-
tive in trying to minimize their collective effort; this inﬂu-
ences how they represent partner-speciﬁc information and
how they adapt their perspective choices.Acknowledgments
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